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Abstract: To date, Antarctica is the only continent to have escaped the COVID-19 pandemic. This was
facilitated by the continent's isolation and low human presence, combined with the global emergence
of the pandemic at the end of the Antarctic summer season and the rapid action of those national
governmental operators and other actors still active on and around the continent during the early
phases of the outbreak. Here, we consider the implications of the pandemic for Antarctic governance,
national operator logistics, science, tourism and the fishing industry, as well as for Antarctic
environmental protection. Global disruption will result in a temporary decrease in human activity in
Antarctica, in turn leading to a reduction in environmental impacts for a period, but also a reduced
capacity to respond to environmental incidents. Given the diversity of transmission routes and vectors,
preventing the introduction of the virus will be difficult, even with stringent quarantine procedures in
place, and the risks and implications of virus transmission to Antarctic wildlife are largely unknown.
With control of the pandemic a major global challenge, international cooperation will be essential if
Antarctica is to remain free of coronavirus.
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Introduction
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by the
virus SARS-CoV-2, is causing widespread sickness and
mortality around the world (https://www.who.int/docs/
default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200712-
covid-19-sitrep-174.pdf ?sfvrsn=5d1c1b2c_2), along with
considerable and probably extended societal and global
economic impacts. The virus is thought to be spread
through the human population primarily via airborne
droplets from coughing, sneezing or talking (particularly
during more prolonged contact/exposure in enclosed
spaces) and through touching of contaminated surfaces
(Asadi et al. 2020), with the main symptoms including
high fever, persistent cough, loss of senses of taste and
smell and fatigue (Rothan & Byrareddy 2020). In more
serious cases, pneumonia-like symptoms develop leading
to inflammation of the lungs, which appears to be the
primary cause of mortality. Mortality risk for infected
individuals increases exponentially with age, and the
elderly and immunosuppressed are considered
particularly vulnerable, with a high proportion within
these groups requiring hospitalization following
infection and, in turn, a high proportion of those
hospitalized going on to require intensive care, generally
requiring artificial ventilation (Richardson et al. 2020).
In an effort to reduce virus transmission and prevent
healthcare systems from being overwhelmed, many
national governments have put in place measures to limit
or ban large (or any) gatherings and to promote or
enforce social distancing or self-isolation (Anderson
et al. 2020), with these measures likely to be in place for
many months at least.
In the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic,
Antarctica is the only continent thought to have
remained free of cases of infection by the SARS-CoV-2
virus. However, in an area under international
governance through the Antarctic Treaty System
(Jacobsson 2011), it remains to be seen how the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (those Antarctic
Treaty Parties with decision-making authority) will deal
with the crisis, and how national governmental operators
and the Antarctic tourism industry, represented by the
International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators
(IAATO), which between them control the vast majority
of movement of people to, from and around the
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Antarctic continent and surrounding remote islands, will
respond.
By early March 2020, as awareness of the debilitating
effects of the virus and the ease of its transmission
between humans became clear, many national Antarctic
programmes had already undertaken or were in the
process of the normal downscaling of their operations in
preparation for the onset of the winter (Laing &
Garrison 2020) and the summer Antarctic cruise
tourism industry was coming to an end. For those
national programmes yet to complete their summer
activities, globally widespread restrictions to limit
transmission of the virus meant major disruptions in
international travel, making repatriation of remaining
Antarctic summer personnel back to their home nations
a priority (see Figs 1 & 2).
For example, as normal international air routes became
unavailable, the British Antarctic Survey chartered the
cruise vessel MS Hebridean Sky to provide safe and
secure passage for 85 scientists, support staff and
contractors to return from the access point of the
Falkland Islands to the UK (https://www.bas.ac.uk/
media-post/antarctic-homecoming-responding-to-covid-19).
In a similar case, 26 Indian personnel were stranded in
Cape Town on their return journey from Maitri Station
in Dronning Maud Land, until they were repatriated
by the Indian government (https://www.outlookindia.
com/newsscroll/26-scientists-among-150-indians-returning-
home-from-s-africa-this-week/1840097). A number of
national operators that would normally return personnel
using international air routes were forced to transport
them from Antarctica to their home continents using
their own or other countries' logistic support vessels. At
the same time, global awareness of the high risk of virus
transmission on board vessels became apparent
following the high infection rate on the cruise ship MS
Diamond Princess (Mallapaty 2020). As a result, the
major gateway destination nations of Chile and
Argentina, through which the majority of national
and tourism operators route their vessels, aeroplanes
and personnel/visitors, restricted their access, and the
Antarctic tourism season came to a more rapid end than
planned (Laing & Garrison 2020, https://edition.cnn.
com/2020/04/07/americas/greg-mortimer-cruise-ship-
coronavirus-intl-hnk/index.html). In one reported
incident, 24 passengers displayed COVID-19 symptoms
on their return journey from a cruise including popular
visitor sites on the Antarctic Peninsula aboard the MS
Greg Mortimer, which initially departed from Ushuaia in
mid-March 2020 (Ing et al. 2020). When tested offshore
from Montevideo, Uruguay, 12 days after the initial
outbreak, 59% of passengers and crew were positive for
COVID-19, with 81% asymptomatic, although, tragically,
later there was one fatality. It is therefore highly probable
that visitors from this vessel carrying the SARS-CoV-2
virus landed at the Antarctic sites visited, including the
highly visited Deception Island, Danco Island and
Paradise Bay (Ing et al. 2020). Although no other similar
reports appear to be publicly available, it seems unlikely
that this would be the only such vessel so affected.
Fishing vessels active in the Southern Ocean were, in
some instances, able to complete their planned journeys
following the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. For
example, krill fishing continued around the Antarctic
Peninsula and South Orkney Islands in April and May,
with the catch quota reached by June 2020. Where crew
and mandatory scientific observers (required under the
Convention on Conservation of Marine Living
Resources (CAMLR Convention); see CCAMLR 2020)
were already available, some fishing trips were able to
commence. However, restrictions on international travel
have caused difficulties in mobilizing crew and observers
to and from departure ports. For example, the crew of
one New Zealand long-line fishing vessel, San Aspiring,
owned by the Sanford fishing company, was stranded in
the Falkland Islands, as safe travel via international
flights was not available. Sanford sent another vessel,
San Aotea, from New Zealand to the Falkland Islands
to return the crew back to New Zealand (https://en.
mercopress.com/2020/07/01/kiwi-longliners-meet-at-falklands-
san-aotea-on-thursday-leaves-for-new-zealand).
Preventing the virus reaching Antarctica has been a
high priority for national operators, as the often
cramped and communal living conditions on research
stations and vessels would facilitate its rapid
transmission, and a lack of specialist medical equipment,
staff or medical evacuation options (especially during
the winter) could prevent effective treatment of the most
serious cases. For now, Antarctica is thought to be free
of the virus, with the ∼1000 overwintering personnel at
38 stations across the continent remaining safe from
infection due to their extreme isolation, as access by ship
or aircraft during winter is rare. But what will the future
bring as, all too soon, Antarctica will become accessible
again at the onset of the next spring and, necessarily, at
least some operations will resume in order to supply and
relieve overwintering stations? In this paper, we consider
the implications of the global COVID-19 pandemic for
Antarctic governance, national operator logistics, scientific
research, tourism and fishing, as well as for the Antarctic
environment.
Governance
The negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, which
placed pre-existing national territorial claims into
abeyance, put in place the mechanism for a form of
international governance of the Antarctic continent and
surrounding Southern Ocean above latitude 60°S.
Currently, 54 nations are signatories to the Antarctic
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Treaty ('Parties'), with the 29 Consultative Parties that have
demonstrated substantial research activity in the region
eligible to partake in governance decision-making
through a consensus model at the normally annual
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) (Gray &
Hughes 2016) (Fig. 1). The Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (signed 1991, entered
into force 1998) sets out basic principles for the
protection of the Antarctic environment and established
the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP),
which normally meets annually to provide advice and
formulate recommendations to the Parties in connection
with the implementation of this Protocol for
consideration at the ATCM. However, due to the risks
associated with COVID-19, the planned 2020 ATCM
and meeting of the CEP, scheduled to convene during
the period 25 May–4 June in Helsinki, Finland, were
cancelled. The ATCM rules of procedure allow for
intersessional consultation and agreed action by the
Antarctic Treaty Secretariat (ATS; see para. 46: https://
documents.ats.aq/atcm42/ww/ATCM42_ww010_e.pdf);
however, it remains to be seen to what degree discussion
on the impact of COVID-19 will be undertaken across
the Treaty Parties facilitated by virtual rather than
face-to-face communication. Taking the broader remit of
the Treaty Parties into consideration, the work of the
ATCM and CEP will inevitably be delayed to some
extent. From an environmental management perspective,
revision of existing protected area management plans
and designation of new protected areas will be
postponed, as will agreement of initiatives to respond to
the effects of climate change in Antarctica. Nevertheless,
some intersessional work is likely to continue through
various ATCM and CEP fora, including the CEP
Subsidiary Group on Management Plans and Subsidiary
Group on Climate Change Response, in anticipation of
the next face-to-face ATCM and CEP meeting, or
pending the development of an alternative virtual
mechanism for ATCM decision-making.
The Antarctic Treaty is based upon openness and
freedom of international scientific investigation and
cooperation, including the exchange of scientific
personnel between Antarctic expeditions. Furthermore,
the Treaty allows Parties to inspect the stations, ships and
aircraft of other signatories within the Treaty area, and
for designated observers to 'have complete freedom of
access at any time to any and all areas of Antarctica',
although the effectiveness of this system has been
questioned (Tamm 2018). The ability to fulfil these
actions may be jeopardized by the quarantine procedures
made necessary by COVID-19, thereby undermining,
albeit temporarily and for sound reasons, some of the
founding principles of the Antarctic Treaty System.
The CAMLR Convention was established with the
primary objective of conserving living resources in the
Southern Ocean, where conservation includes rational
use of those resources (www.ccamlr.org). Fishing is
intended to be demonstrably sustainable, and each year
Fig. 1.Map of the world showing Consultative and Non-consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty (https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?
lang=e) and the main gateway locations used by national governmental operators and the tourism and fishing industries to access
Antarctica.
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the Parties to the Convention meet and use available
scientific data to set catch limits for each fishery
(primarily including toothfish, icefish and krill) within
the Southern Ocean, and to agree associated
conservation measures. The CAMLR Convention rules
of procedure allow for intersessional decision-making
(see Rule 7: https://www.ccamlr.org/en/system/files/e-
pt3_0.pdf), but the practicalities of agreeing new and
updated conservation measures, including those
pertaining to catch limits for commercially harvested
species, for the coming year in the absence of a physical
meeting have yet to be determined.
Impacts upon national operator logistics, science, tourism
and the fishing industry
National operator logistics
Some Antarctic programmes, such as that of Spain, ended
their 2019–20 field seasons early in anticipation of
Fig. 2. Map of Antarctica showing the major seasonal and year-round research stations and tourist visitor sites (COMNAP 2017,
IAATO 2019).
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international travel restrictions, while many national
operators had all but completed their planned summer
field season by the time COVID-19 became a global
pandemic (Laing & Garrison 2020). This means that,
for some, the implementation of broader quarantine
practices to keep the virus out of Antarctica in the next
operational season have yet to be tested. Some nations
that rely heavily upon logistic support provided by other
nations, such as Portugal and the Netherlands, have
largely or completely cancelled their Antarctic
programme for the 2020–21 field season (European
Polar Board 2020). However, the 20 nations operating
year-round research stations will need to replace
overwintering personnel and resupply the stations, or
close and secure their stations entirely. At the present
time, most national Antarctic programmes plan little
more than to support essential operational activity and
planned maintenance until greater certainty is achieved,
in which case only some high-priority fieldwork may be
attempted (COMNAP 2017, Antarctica New Zealand
2020a, European Polar Board 2020, https://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/india-wont-miss-its-annual-antarctic-
expedition-despite-covid-19-situation/articleshow/75726160.
cms). Infrastructure construction or redevelopment
projects have been scaled back at Rothera Research
Station (UK) and Scott Base (New Zealand) (Antarctica
New Zealand 2020a, 2020b, British Antarctic Survey
2020a). Forward preparation of logistical support for
future science projects, such as the preparatory
deployment of deep-field depots, has also be reduced or
delayed (Voosen 2020). Some Antarctic scientific cruises
may proceed as planned or in modified form (e.g. the
Polarstern cruise of the Weddell Sea by Germany; see
European Polar Board 2020), but lack of certainty
concerning access to ports for refuelling or taking on
stores or personnel prior to entering the Southern Ocean
may make some cruises unviable. The Council of
Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP;
www.comnap.aq) has facilitated information exchange on
plans for the 2020–21 summer season between national
operators and non-governmental organizations working
in Antarctica and has prepared practical COVID-19
guidance, albeit these are only available to COMNAP
members at present. Nations that host 'gateway' Antarctic
departure/return points have put in place protocols for
the management of ships, aircraft and personnel entering
or leaving Antarctica via their country (https://batimes.
com.ar/news/world/antarctica-is-still-free-of-covid-19-
but-can-it-stay-that-way.phtml), thereby providing the
opportunity to ensure a level of consistency in
biosecurity practices across all operators using those
access routes (e.g. https://www.spp-antarktisforschung.
de/storages/uni-rostock/Alle_MNF/Antarktisforschung/
Dokumente/Aktuelles/COVID-19_PROTOCOL_INACH_
english.pdf) (see Fig. 1).
Scientific research
Faced with uncertainty regarding the accessibility of
gateway ports, coupled with the need to prevent
SARS-CoV-2 from reaching Antarctica, many nations
have already drastically scaled back their science plans
for the 2020–21 field season (e.g. see https://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/india-wont-miss-its-annual-antarctic-
expedition-despite-covid-19-situation/articleshow/75726160.
cms). Several nations plan to continue supporting long-
term science monitoring programmes in the vicinity
of some Antarctic and sub-Antarctic research stations
to prevent gaps in long-term datasets (e.g. the collection of
data on higher predator (i.e. seal and seabird) population
counts and diet compositions as part of the Commission
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living





general, 'deep-field' science (i.e. that requiring onward travel
from research stations by ship or aircraft or multi-day
overland travel) has been put on hold, and nations with
laboratory facilities are limiting station-based activities to
only the most essential research, largely the maintenance
of long-term datasets (Antarctica New Zealand 2020a,
British Antarctic Survey 2020b). The US National Science
Foundation and British Antarctic Survey have postponed
planned fieldwork in the International Thwaites Glacier
Collaboration (ITGC; www.thwaitesglacier.org) examining
the risk of sea-level rise associated with the near-term
melting of parts of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (ITGC
2020). Data on long-term deployed remote scientific
instruments may not be retrieved and the instruments
themselves not maintained until the location is next
visited (Voosen 2020). If located in areas of high snow
accumulation, the equipment may be at risk of being lost
due to burial. As climate change continues, our
understanding of its increasingly dramatic impacts will
be held back if crucial monitoring work is interrupted
(IPCC 2019, Laing & Garrison 2020). Another aspect of
normal monitoring activity likely to be impacted is that
relating to the identification of human impacts, which
helps deliver the Antarctic Treaty System's objective of
environmental protection, in accordance with the
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty. However, scientists may have little opportunity to
monitor the effects of reduced human presence on
Antarctic species, habitats and ecosystems (Tin et al.
2009, Coetzee & Chown 2016, Dunn et al. 2019).
The COVID-19 pandemic has also heavily impacted
scientific and logistical activities away from the
continent, with travel restrictions and safety concerns
necessitating the cancellation of both the Scientific
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Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) Open Science
Conference and the COMNAPAnnual General Meeting
scheduled to take place in Hobart, Tasmania, in late
July/early August 2020 (https://www.antarctica.gov.au/
news/2020/international-antarctic-conferences-
cancelled-due-to-coronavirus).With the physicalmeetings
cancelled, SCAR moved a much-reduced version of the
conference to an online format (3–7 August 2020;
https://www.scar2020.org), as did COMNAP. Other
impacts affecting the delivery of scientific outputs have
included the partial or complete shutdown of many
universities and research institutes, the cancellation or
deferral of research funding and a hiatus in employment
for fixed-term researchers and research students. In the
future, further probable impacts include redundancies
and enforced retirements of established researchers, as
governments are forced to address the deep impacts of
the pandemic on national economies (Korbel & Stegle
2020, Myers et al. 2020).
Tourism
After a record number of 74 401 tourist visitors to
Antarctica in the 2019–20 summer (IAATO 2020), it
will be a challenge for the largely cruise-based tourism
industry to operate effectively in 2020–21. Multiple
factors will play a role, including potential access
restrictions at gateway ports and airports (see Fig. 1),
the likelihood of severe ongoing long-haul international
travel restrictions and probable lower demand from
customers (many of whom are more elderly and
therefore demographically more vulnerable to the virus)
due to concern over infection risk and difficulties in
acquiring medical insurance (Ing et al. 2020, Liu et al.
2020). National governments permitting tourism
activities in Antarctica may stipulate minimum
quarantine or social distancing standards to increase
passenger safety, although the physical constraints and
economics of providing adequate mitigation, given the
structure of typical smaller cruise vessels, and the
reliance of the Antarctic cruise industry on small boat
supported landings, could be insurmountable or
impractical. On King George Island, South Shetland
Islands, Chile has facilitated the use of Teniente Rodolfo
Marsh Martin Airport by some tour operators as a
cruise exchange point, flying visitors in and out of
Antarctica using the commercial airline Aerovías DAP,
where they join or leave their cruise vessel (Liggett &
Stewart 2017). These flights also bring tourists who
make a short overnight stay at an established tourist
camp on the island. Making this a viable option from a
safety perspective during the 2020–21 season may be
challenging, while various national operators also utilize
the same air link and flights. All of these factors may
combine to result in a dramatic short-term decline in the
Antarctic tourism industry on a scale comparable to, if
not considerably greater and longer lasting than, the
43% drop in visitor numbers following the global
economic downturn of 2007–08 (Nicola et al. 2020) (see
Fig. 3).
Fishing industry
The COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted the
global fishing industry by limiting or preventing the
landing, processing and distribution of fish to customers
and restricting the rotation of crew due to quarantine
practices (Bennett et al. 2020, Havice et al. 2020).
Currently, it is unclear how these factors may affect the
Southern Ocean fishery during the coming months,
including how the fishing industry will respond and
whether or not fishing will be possible in the short term
if CCAMLR procedures for decision-making on
conservation measures are affected. For example, under
the CAMLR Convention scheme of international
scientific observation (SISO), all vessels fishing in the
CAMLR Convention Area are required to carry an
observer for some or all of their fishing operations
(CCAMLR 2020). Therefore, prior to departure,
quarantine practices may be needed for all crew and
observers to ensure that there is no SARS-CoV-2 aboard
ship, as transmission could be extremely rapid aboard
these vessels. Due to high operational costs, fishing
vessels maximize their time at sea and very rarely land
on the continent, so risk of viral transmission to
Antarctic communities is likely to be low. However, it
may be increased in the eventuality of accidents, or ship
entrapment in ice, requiring support and rescue from
other (national operator) vessels, as has occurred several
times in recent years in the Ross and Amundsen seas
Fig. 3. Tourist visitors to Antarctica (1992–93 to 2019–20)
(IAATO 2019, 2020).
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(e.g. the fire aboard the Jeong Woo 2 in 2012, when three
lives were lost; see https://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/
magazines/safe-seas-clean-seas/issue-39/issue-39-6.asp).
In the specific case of South Georgia (a sub-Antarctic
island that lies within the CAMLR Convention Area
but north of 60° latitude), the island's governmental
authorities currently require fishing and tourist vessels to
be inspected by government officers at King Edward
Point prior to commencing their activities in the island's
economic zone. This may create an opportunity for
COVID-19 transmission, and this is a particular concern
as tourist and national operator vessels fulfilling the
same requirement often go on to visit the Antarctic
Treaty area after calling at South Georgia.
A potential reduction in fishing activity may reduce the
quantity of fish harvested, including non-target species,
as well as reduce incidental mortality of marine
mammals and seabirds. However, should there be fewer
properly licenced fishing vessels active in the region, and
possibly fewer government patrol vessels, illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing may increase,
having spent several years largely under control,
potentially contributing to non-sustainable depletion of
fish stocks and to lower standards of viral biosecurity
applied to their crews (Osterblom et al. 2015, Bennett
et al. 2020).
Environmental impact
Under these unprecedented circumstances, how will a
reduced human presence, over the short term at least,
affect the Antarctic environment? Antarctic terrestrial
ecosystems are simple, comprising mosses, lichens,
liverworts and only two species of flowering plant, with
the native terrestrial fauna limited to microinvertebrates,
protozoa, tardigrades, nematodes, rotifers and only two
insect species (Convey 2017). Microbial species rapidly
become dominant with higher elevation and distance
from the coast. The richest terrestrial communities, bird
colonies and seal haul-out sites are limited to the 15%
(∼6000 km2) of the total ice-free area across the
continent (∼44 000 km2) that is located close to the
coast where generally milder climatic conditions are
found (Hull & Bergstrom 2006, Convey 2017, Bokhorst
et al. 2019). However, it is within this small area that
most research stations and tourist visitor sites are found
(Brooks et al. 2019), resulting in direct and ongoing
competition between the needs of humans vs those of
nature and creating a challenge for effective protection
and conservation (Pertierra et al. 2017, Leihy et al. 2020).
Human activity in Antarctica has led to
well-documented local environmental impacts, including
non-native species introductions (Frenot et al. 2005,
Hughes et al. 2015), major one-off and chronic pollution
events (Bargagli 2005) and destruction of terrestrial and
marine habitat (Tin et al. 2009). A sudden and
substantial reduction in human activity within
Antarctica potentially has clear short-term benefits for
Antarctic ecosystems. The risk of introduction of
non-native species to marine and terrestrial
environments will decrease with the reduced arrival of
cruise and research vessels and landings of tourist
visitors, cargo and national operator personnel (Frenot
et al. 2005, Chown et al. 2012, Hughes et al. 2015,
Convey & Peck 2019, McCarthy et al. 2019). With many
national operators temporarily scaling down or ceasing
deep-field activities, the risks of intra- and inter-regional
transfer of species will also be reduced (Hughes et al.
2019). However, trampling impacts upon fragile Antarctic
soil and vegetation often have long-lasting consequences
due to naturally slow recovery rates, so short-term
reductions in human activity may have only limited
benefits (Tejedo et al. 2016, https://www.environments.aq/
emerging-issues/the-impacts-of-trampling-and-ground-
disturbances-on-antarctic-soils). The risk of major
pollution events resulting from marine incidents should
decline with fewer vessels operating in the area
(Kennicutt et al. 1991, Aronson et al. 2011), albeit that,
should an incident occur, the already limited capacity to
mount search and rescue and any required oil spill
responses will be diminished further (Filler et al. 2015).
With fewer vessels and some summer-only research
stations remaining closed, fuel combustion for power
generation will decline with a concurrent temporary
reduction in local greenhouse gas production and
atmospheric pollution (Wolff 1992, Poland et al. 2003,
Amelung & Lamers 2007). However, with some stations
and facilities remaining unvisited and routine
maintenance not being undertaken, the chance of
leakage from fuel storage systems may increase, along
with other sources of pollution, particularly where
existing infrastructure is already aging (Wilkness 1990,
Tin et al. 2009, Braun et al. 2014). A further pollution
threat concerns the potential for loss, through burial, of
fuel drums stored in remote locations to support
deep-field activities, some of which need to be raised
every 1–2 years (depending upon the snow accumulation
rate). Lower research station occupancy will also result
in lower volumes of sewage release to the environment,
thereby temporarily reducing the release of pollutants,
such as trace metals and microplastics, and
non-indigenous microorganisms (Connor 2008, Power
et al. 2016, Reed et al. 2018, Stark et al. 2019, Webb
et al. 2020). Lower levels of visitation will reduce
disturbance of wildlife, which may be particularly
relevant in locations where wildlife population declines
have been linked to tourism and national operator
activity (Pfeiffer 2005, Coetzee & Chown 2016, Dunn
et al. 2019, https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/
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default/files/medien/461/publikationen/4424.pdf). Ongoing
or planned major infrastructure projects or station
redevelopment work may be slowed or postponed,
delaying any associated environmental impacts
(Antarctica New Zealand 2020b, British Antarctic
Survey 2020a, European Polar Board 2020, https://
future.usap.gov/what-is-aims/). Limits on field party
activity could, in the short term, reduce the rate of
expansion of the human footprint within Antarctica,
thereby prolonging the integrity of the region's
wilderness areas (Hughes et al. 2011, Leihy et al. 2020).
Keeping SARS-CoV-2 out of Antarctica
Many potential routes exist for the importation of
SARS-CoV-2 into Antarctica. Ships are the main means
for transport of people and cargo to Antarctica,
although many national operator personnel today arrive
in Antarctica by air. Estimates of the intensity of
shipping activity across fishing, tourism and research
sectors suggest there may be ∼180 vessels and
≥ 500 voyages in Antarctic waters annually, with a
concentration of activity around the northern Antarctica
Peninsula and Scotia Arc, where ∼50% of Antarctic
research stations and most of the established tourist
visitors sites are located (see https://www.ats.aq/devAS/
Ats/VisitorSiteGuidelines?lang=e) (Fig. 2), as well as the
most intense fishery activity (McCarthy et al. 2019).
Once within the Antarctic Treaty area, vessels may
resupply or visit several stations and support scientific,
logistical or tourism activities at multiple locations,
thereby acting as potential dispersal agents for the virus,
both into and within Antarctica. Aircraft are used by
both national governmental operators and the tourism
industry to transport people and high-priority or
perishable cargo (such a fresh foods) rapidly to
Antarctica, and in relative comfort compared to the
often rough and extended ocean crossing by ship.
Aircraft operators may experience difficulty accessing
Antarctica due to flight restrictions in South America
and elsewhere. Aircraft operated by several national
operators as well as commercial companies often use a
number of established airstrips. In particular, Teniente
Rodolfo Marsh Martin Airfield, Fildes Peninsula
(Chile), Rothera Research Station, Adelaide Island
(UK), Troll Airfield (Norway), Novo Runway (Russian
Federation; Antarctic Logistics Centre International
(ALCI)) and McMurdo Station (USA) are used as
stopping and/or refuelling points as aircraft transit
through to other research stations and field locations on
the continent; however, this in itself has risk and will
need to be managed (Hughes et al. 2019).
The Drake Passage separates the Antarctic Peninsula
from southern South America, and the ∼800 km
crossing provides the most rapid ship access to the
continent, typically taking 2–3 days, while aircraft can
access the continent in only a few hours (as little as
1.5 hours from Punta Arenas to King George Island,
4–5 hours to Adelaide Island and 4 hours to Union
Glacier) (Bender et al. 2016). These time periods are
considerably shorter than the incubation period of the
virus for an infected person, and such flights are shorter
than virus viability in the atmosphere or on various
surfaces (Asadi et al. 2020, van Doremalen et al. 2020),
demonstrating the need for effective quarantine practices
of staff for ∼14 days prior to Antarctic deployment
(Laurer et al. 2020).
The Antarctic research community and national
operators have considered and implemented, to varying
extents, wider biosecurity procedures to prevent the
introduction of non-native species to Antarctica (Chown
et al. 2012, https://www.comnap.aq/wp-content/uploads/
2019/11/Intercontinental-Checklists-2019.pdf) and, to a
lesser degree, the anthropogenic dispersal of native and
non-native species within the continent (Hughes et al.
2019), although the extent to which these would have
any impact on the introduction of viruses is unclear.
General consideration has also been given to the
prevention of dispersal of animal pathogens between
bird colonies and seal haul-out sites (Kerry & Riddle
2009, https://documents.ats.aq/ATCM42/WW/ATCM42_
WW008_e.pdf). However, the imposition of quarantine
measures to prevent the dispersal of human disease
within Antarctica had received little international
attention prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, representing
a major logistical challenge for both national operators
and the tourism and fishing industries. National
operators are increasingly aware of these issues and are
making considerable efforts to plan for the 2020–21
summer season, giving priority to the health of their
personnel and visitors and to the Antarctic environment
(Antarctica New Zealand 2020a, British Antarctic
Survey 2020b).
SARS-CoV-2 may be transmitted via symptomatic and
asymptomatic individuals (Nishiura & Kobayashi 2020,
Yu & Yang 2020), making the use of a 14 day
quarantine and testing period prior to travel a sensible
precaution to reduce the risk of transmission (Chen et al.
2020). The virus may also be transferred via recently
contaminated cargo and food supplies, albeit virus load
may be low. Frozen foods are routinely used to provision
Antarctic stations; however, coronaviruses in general show
considerable stability in a frozen state and may survive for
up to 2 years at -20°C, so ensuring adequate quarantine
or sterilization practices may not be easily delivered
(https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/
situation-reports/20200221-sitrep-32-covid-19.pdf ?sfvrsn=
4802d089_2). To safeguard station personnel, individual
national operators may also be reluctant to host visits
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from either other national operators or cruise vessels at
their Antarctic and sub-Antarctic research stations, as has
been common practice to date (Bender et al. 2016, Laing
& Garrison 2020, https://www.antarctica.gov.au/news/
2020/australian-antarctic-program-precautionary-measures-
against-novel-coronavirus). Heritage organizations that
normally operate on the continent may not be able to
undertake routine maintenance of historic huts, such as
those in the Ross Sea region, or be able to provide staff to
manage the hut at Port Lockroy (Antarctic Peninsula)
(Dunn et al. 2019, https://nzaht.org/covid-19-update/,
https://www.ukaht.org/news/latest-news/what-does-covid-19-
mean-for-ukaht-1/). The implications of reduced access
to historical and heritage sites may be minimal in the
short term, unless urgent building maintenance is
required. Nevertheless, a reduction in Antarctic tourist
visitation may result in a decline in donations to these
organizations, which may have longer-term implications
for the conservation of Antarctic heritage.
Risk to human health should the COVID-19 pandemic
reach Antarctica
Currently, there are no vaccines available against
COVID-19 infection, no specific antiviral drugs to treat
those infected and only limited treatments available that
appear to lessen the effects of the more serious cases or
the probability of mortality. Should SARS-CoV-2 be
transferred to Antarctica, regional climatic conditions
may influence its viability and transmissibility. Some
preliminary evidence suggests that lower temperatures
and humidities, which are characteristic in Antarctica,
may increase the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (Tobías
& Molina 2020, Wang et al. unpublished data).
However, conversely, many microorganisms and viruses
are susceptible to damage by ultraviolet (UV) radiation;
consequently, high levels of UV radiation in Antarctica,
particularly during mid-summer and the period of
anthropogenic ozone depletion in the spring, may
reduce transmission risk in the outdoor environment
(Hughes 2005, Carleton et al. unpublished data,
Karapiperis et al. unpublished data, Merow & Urban
unpublished data).
In stark contrast to the more mature age demographics
of tourist visitors, research and support personnel
travelling to Antarctica with national operators are often
from lower age groups and are generally subject to
rigorous medical screening prior to deployment, making
them potentially less susceptible to developing the more
severe symptoms of COVID-19 (Davies et al. 2020).
Conversely, many personnel typically engage in tiring
physical work under demanding environmental
conditions with limited access to fresh foods, which may
negatively affect their immune system (Tingate et al.
1997). In particular, mucosal immune suppression has
been reported in the early months of an Antarctic
expedition (less so during the overwintering period),
which is the period of greatest movement of personnel
and potential transmission risk (Cameron & Moore
1968, Gleeson et al. 2000). Furthermore, psychological
stress and anxiety, possibly exacerbated by concern about
the safety of friends and family members from COVID-19




2030-31.pdf), may also affect susceptibility to disease
(Palinkas & Suedfeld 2008, Khandelwal et al. 2015).
On a typical research station, physical space is at a
premium and personnel live in close proximity, sharing
bedrooms/bunkrooms and bathroom facilities and eating
in communal spaces, making social distancing
impractical and providing substantial opportunities for
virus transmission. Furthermore, most people infected
with SARS-CoV-2 are believed to shed the virus in their
faeces, even if they are asymptomatic, so research station
sewage systems present a major risk of further virus
transmission, with sewage treatment plant technicians
being particularly at risk (Gormley et al. 2020, Zhang
et al. 2020). Medical facilities vary greatly across
research stations and on board vessels (COMNAP
2017), and few if any are equipped with the sophisticated
medical equipment, including ventilators, required to
treat serious infections, while medical oxygen supplies
required to aid those in respiratory distress are generally
very limited or not available (Ñamendys-Silva 2020).
Currently, serious medical issues normally result in the
patient being evacuated from Antarctica. However, this
can present extreme logistical challenges (including risk
to the personnel involved), require the diversion of
resources from other tasks, take considerable time and
may be hampered by poor weather conditions,
particularly if the person concerned is part of a remote
field party or the requirement arises in the Antarctic
winter. A limited number of wintering stations, as well
as summer field parties, are located at high altitude
(≥ 3000 m above sea level) on the polar plateau, where
atmospheric pressure may make any lung infections that
limit oxygen uptake more serious (COMNAP 2017).
Given the rapid rate at which COVID-19 symptoms can
develop, dealing with an infection in Antarctica is likely
to be a serious and potentially life-threatening issue,
particularly as most vessels and smaller research stations
do not have doctors or fully trained medical
professionals. It may also be difficult to safeguard the
health of those providing care, many of whom will not
be professional medical practitioners trained in the
proper use of personal protective equipment (where
available), hand hygiene, aseptic techniques and
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environmental infection control measures, instead being
general station personnel with some additional first aid
training (Cheung et al. 2020).
Should instances of COVID-19 infection become
apparent at an Antarctic research station, the typical
geographical isolation of stations and the limited and
well-controlled number of transport routes between them
mean that isolation and quarantine measures could, in
most cases, be rapidly and effectively applied (Pertierra
et al. 2017, Hughes et al. 2019). Similarly, an outbreak
aboard ship should be easily contained within the vessel.
However, in areas where there are clusters of stations and
frequent exchange of personnel, such as the South
Shetland Islands, Larsemann Hills and parts of Victoria
Land, quarantine measures may be more difficult to
enforce (Laing & Garrison 2020). For example, the
Chilean Eduardo Frei Montalva Station and the Russian
Federation's Bellingshausen Station on Fildes Peninsula
are directly adjacent to one another, five other stations
are located in the immediate vicinity around Maxwell
Bay and the area is a transport hub for personnel
travelling on to other stations as well as national operator
and cruise vessels. In this case, internationally agreed and
enforced quarantine practices will be required to prevent
virus spread following an outbreak (COMNAP 2017).
Difficulties may be further exacerbated where airstrip
infrastructure is used by more than one nation. Examples
include the Teniente Rodolfo Marsh Martin Aerodrome
on Fildes Peninsula, operated by Chile (which is used by
multiple nations including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the
UK, Uruguay and the commercial airline Aerovías DAP
from Chile), and Rothera Research Station, which is used
by aircraft from the UK, the USA, Canada (charter for
Italy, the USA and other nations), Germany, China and
Chile, or the Williams Field airfield near McMurdo
Station, Southern Victoria Land, which is operated by
the USA and also used by the Canadian charter
operator, New Zealand and, occasionally, Italian,
Korean, British and Australian logistics. Should a case of
COVID-19 become evident at a research station, one
response might be the evacuation of that person and
other (if not all) personnel on that station from the
continent as rapidly as possible. However, finding a
gateway port that will accept a number of infected
personnel, or those suspected of infection, could be
problematic. Furthermore, the most rapid route off
the continent may entail air transport via other stations
and/or the use of ships, probably involving assistance
from other operators, which may generate substantial
risks of further infection. More generally, it remains to be
seen how necessary quarantine measures may affect the
ability of national operators to provide and engage with
emergency search and rescue operations. In particular,
the relative prioritization of quarantine and search and
rescue is not clear.
Virus transmission to Antarctic wildlife
Antarctica is well known for its charismatic wildlife,
including penguins and seals, which often congregate in
densely packed colonies, and there is a general concern
about transfer of disease to Antarctic wildlife (Kerry &
Riddle 2009). Animal mass mortality events due to
disease are little documented within Antarctica, and
current knowledge of pathogens and diseases in wildlife
is limited (Barbosa & Palacios 2009, Grimaldi et al.
2015). Within the Antarctic region, evidence for several
commonly pathogenic viruses has been recorded in
avifauna (e.g. influenza virus A, Newcastle disease virus)
and marine mammals (e.g. sealpox virus and canine
distemper virus) (for an overview, see https://www.
environments.aq/information-summaries/antarctic-wildlife-
diseases). The zoonotic origins of many coronaviruses
(including SARS-CoV-2) are thought to be from bats,
the natural reservoir host, where they are generally
non-pathogenic; however, pathogenicity may occur
following transmission to a new host species, including
humans (Zhou et al. 2020). Coronaviruses have been
isolated from a variety of infected birds, mammals and
other vertebrates, including cats, cows, dogs, ducks,
ferrets, lions, mice, mink, pangolins, pigs, tigers, turkeys
and some snake species, with a subset of these exhibiting
disease symptoms, but the extent of the intermediate
host range for SARS-CoV-2 has yet to be determined
(Opriessnig & Huang 2020, Ye et al. 2020, Leroy et al.
in press). The potential for zoonotic transmission of
SARS-CoV-2 from humans to Antarctic wildlife, which
could result in rapid spread within colonies and even
animal mass mortality events, is a cause for concern.
However, the ability of this virus to jump the species
barrier to Antarctic wildlife, via humans or other
species, and the likelihood of disease symptoms
developing are as yet unknown (Goumenou et al. 2020,
Leroy et al. in press). Some Antarctic species, including
skuas, gulls and fur seals, migrate from Antarctica to
places, such as southern South America, where there are
already high COVID-19 infection rates in human
populations and contaminated water sources, and they
could act as a further route for infection in populations
within Antarctica. Should humans on research stations
become infected, released sewage may contain the virus,
thereby providing a further mechanism for infection
of wildlife in the vicinity (Smith & Riddle 2009, Stark
et al. 2019).
A recent report examined the likelihood of reverse
zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to
Antarctica wildlife (Barbosa et al. unpublished data).
Given the lack of information available concerning the
potential for infection of Antarctic species, the authors
advocate use of the precautionary principle and propose
a set of guidelines to reduce the risk of reverse zoonotic
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transmission of the virus from humans to Antarctic
wildlife (Barbosa et al. unpublished data).
Considerations for the longer term
Here, we have considered predominantly the short-term
impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic upon Antarctica.
The unprecedented nature of this worldwide heath crisis
means that predicting how global society will adapt and
respond is extremely difficult. Given that activity in
Antarctica is almost entirely dictated and driven by
priorities within individual nations and the rapid rate at
which those priorities are changing, the future range and
extent of human activities in Antarctica are difficult to
predict. What is not in doubt is the high cost of
conducting Antarctic research. With the global economy
under considerable strain and many new calls on
national resources, the funding of Antarctic research
may appear to be a relative luxury. However, this
perspective overlooks the critical nature of Antarctic
research in our understanding of globally important
ongoing issues including climate change and sea-level
rise (ITGC 2020). While COVID-19 is resulting in
global upheaval, the threats presented by global
environmental change over the coming decades may be
considerably more severe (IPCC 2019). A priority for the
Antarctic community will be to communicate the
importance of Antarctic research to national
governments in order to ensure ongoing investment.
Since sealers first set foot on the continent 200 years
ago, Antarctica has tested the resilience, determination
and ingenuity of those who seek to go there. COVID-19
is an additional challenge that must be effectively
managed to ensure science of global relevance is
maintained. Nevertheless, a forced reduction in research
activity on the continent itself may provide an
opportunity for scientists to further analyse some of the
many existing datasets collected prior to the pandemic,
thereby increasing scientific knowledge without further
associated environmental impact in Antarctica, although
this can only be a 'stop gap' or short-term mitigation
measure for the scientific community. It may also create
an opportunity for researchers to reflect on the status of
existing scientific knowledge and how it can be best
communicated to policymakers in order to elicit
appropriate action - an issue of particular and urgent
relevance with regard to climate change (Knutti 2019).
One potentially positive outcome of the pandemic,
which is not exclusive to Antarctica, has been the need
to explore and implement practical methods to hold
international discussions and meetings, particularly in
light of the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
associated with travel (e.g. Blackman et al. 2020).
SCAR, COMNAP and CCAMLR have all held at least
some of their normal meetings via various virtual
meeting platforms, while the ATCM and CEP have
continued using existing online platforms hosted by the
ATS (www.ats.aq). However, this is part of a separate
and wider ongoing debate, with the efficacy of such
approaches being far from resolved. For example,
SCAR's rules of procedure (https://www.scar.org/library/
governance/5118-rules-of-proc-may18/), underlying its
consensus decision-making process, currently demand
that its Delegates' meetings take place in person, but
there has been some delay in the agreement of a virtual
decision-making process by all member nations.
Conclusions
Antarctica's remoteness, the low human presence (up to
5000 national operator staff and ∼75 000 tourists across
a continent of 14 million km2), the emergence of the
COVID-19 pandemic at the end of the Antarctic
summer season and the rapid actions of those nations
and operators still active on the continent at that time
have helped keep Antarctica free of the virus through the
first wave of the global pandemic. However, keeping the
SARS-CoV-2 virus out of Antarctica in the future while
maintaining previous levels of research (including
science in remote field locations) and other forms of
visitation, including by the tourism and fishing
industries, is unlikely at present. The strength of
international cooperation will play an important part in
the exclusion and/or future containment of the virus,
but, in a time of considerable uncertainty, planning of
national responses as well as internationally coordinated
actions bring considerable challenges. With a very short
window before the start of the 2020–21 summer,
national operators will need to implement new protocols
and management strategies that match their national
guidelines and priorities, and they will need to negotiate
with their partners and neighbours to ensure that mutual
support and collaboration in Antarctica are not
compromised. In addition, commercial actors may need
to respond rapidly to the constraints of international
regulation and guidance and the requirements to
maintain the safety of their clients and staff. What
cannot currently be known is how the short-term
responses that are required to manage the clear and
present risks will persist and transform how
Antarctica is managed in the longer term.
Nevertheless, for Antarctic activities to be maintained,
it will be essential for Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR
Parties to actively seeking to minimize disruption to
the governance of Antarctica. CCAMLR have made
efforts to hold some form of virtual meetings in 2020.
However, with the 2020 ATCM in Helsinki already
cancelled due to the pandemic, it remains unclear
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what contingency planning to facilitate
decision-making has been put in place by the Parties
should the planned ATCM XLIII in Paris in 2021 also
need to be cancelled.
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